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Conﬂict Transformation through Prior
Consultation? Lessons from Peru
ALMUT SCHILLING-VACAFLOR and RICCARDA FLEMMER*
Abstract. This article analyses the background to and the content of the Peruvian
prior consultation law – the only one enacted in Latin America to date – and its regu-
lating decree. In contrast to the widespread conception that prior consultation is a
means for preventing and resolving conﬂict, it argues that this new legislation will
not help to transform conﬂicts as long as the normative framework itself is contested
and the preconditions for participatory governance are not in place. Establishing these
preconditions would result in state institutions capable of justly balancing the diverse
interests at stake; measures that reduce power asymmetries within consultations; and
joint decision-making processes with binding agreements.
Keywords: prior consultation, conﬂict transformation, participatory governance, Peru,
indigenous people, extractive industries
Introduction
To include indigenous peoples and local communities in the crafting of legis-
lative and administrative measures liable to aﬀect them is a principle that is
now widely accepted by organisations (for example, the World Bank,
Oxfam, the United Nations) and governments around the world. The
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 See César Rodríguez Garavito, Meghan Morris, Natalia Orduz Salinas and Paula Buriticá, La
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Universidad de los Andes, ).
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right to prior consultation and to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is
an essential part of the international human rights instruments that have been
created out of concern for indigenous peoples. This right is of particular im-
portance in Latin America, where to date  countries have ratiﬁed
International Labour Organisation Convention  (ILO C) on the
rights of indigenous peoples and tribal populations. In addition, the adoption
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) in  has further enhanced the right to FPIC. Such a right
to participation is fundamental, because if ‘rights and citizenship are attained
through agency, not simply bestowed by the state, then the right to participate
– for example the right to claim rights – is a prior right, necessary for making
other rights real’.
In addition to having a rights protection function, prior consultation is fre-
quently understood as a tool for conﬂict prevention and resolution. It is
expected that taking into account the fears and needs of local populations,
ﬁnding joint solutions and complementing expert knowledge with the insights
of aﬀected groups will bring about more democratic, peaceful and sustainable
solutions. But this expectation has not yet been empirically proven, especially
because instances of meaningful participation in Latin America’s resource gov-
ernance are scarce, while reports of absent or ﬂawed prior consultations
abound. Several states that have not complied with their obligation to guar-
antee the right to prior consultation – among them Peru – have insisted that
this was due to the absence of speciﬁc national laws on prior consultation.
In September  Peru ﬁnally promulgated such a law on prior consult-
ation, which is the only one enacted in the entire region to date. Hence, the
research into its potential for conﬂict transformation is of particular interest.
After its promulgation, a ‘meta-consultation’ on its regulating decree was
carried out – a process that, though faulty, may serve as an example of likely
future consultation practices in the country. President Humala announced
that the new legislation would give voice to the needs of Peru’s indigenous
communities and thus contribute to greater social harmony. However, it is
still unclear whether the right to prior consultation according to the new
 John Gaventa, ‘Towards Participatory Governance: Assessing the Transformative
Possibilities’, in Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan (eds.), Participation. From Tyranny to
Transformation? (London and New York: Zedbooks, ), p. .
 See Lisa Laplante and Suzanne Spears, ‘Out of the Conﬂict Zone: The Case for Community
Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector’, Yale Human Rights & Development,  (),
pp. –; United Nations Interagency Framework for Coordination on Preventive
Action, Extractive Industries and Conﬂict (New York: United Nations, ).
 See, for example, Due Process of Law Foundation, El derecho a la consulta previa, libre e infor-
mada de los pueblos indígenas. La situación de Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador y Perú
(Washington: DPLF/OXFAM, ); Amanda Fulmer, Angelina Snodgrass Godoy and
Philip Neﬀ, ‘Indigenous Rights, Resistance and the Law: Lessons from a Guatemalan
Mine’, Latin American Politics and Society, :  (), pp. –.
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legislation will apply to Andean and coastal peasant communities or only to
Amazonian native communities. Peru’s president and his predecessor Alan
García have both publicly stated that they do not consider Andean communi-
ties to be indigenous and have thereby denied these communities’ right to
prior consultation. In fact, the political mobilisation of rural communities
in the Peruvian Andes has been organised more on the basis of class categories,
with the people identifying themselves as ‘peasants’ rather than as ‘indigen-
ous’. Nevertheless, Peruvian indigenous and peasant organisations, supported
by many intellectuals and human rights defenders, have emphasised that Peru’s
peasant communities are descendents of Peru’s original population, with many
of their members speaking Quechua or Aymara and retaining cultural prac-
tices, and should be granted indigenous peoples’ rights. In the past few years
they have increasingly self-identiﬁed as indigenous. Scholars also argue that
violent or discriminatory practices are the reason that ethnicity has not been
salient and that indigenous movements have been rather weak in the
Peruvian Andes.
In addition to important conﬂicts about the groups that hold the right to
prior consultation, the rights subjects, there have been many other issues of
contention related to the elaboration and content of the new consultation
law and its regulating decree. As a consequence, their legitimacy is currently
low. Moreover, our study on the Peruvian law in its wider political, economic
and cultural context reveals that without the development of the ‘pre-condi-
tions of participatory governance’ the new legislation will be able neither to
diﬀuse existing violent conﬂicts nor to prevent new ones. Based on our ana-
lysis we identify three basic, and currently lacking, conditions crucial for the
eﬀective implementation of prior consultations: () state institutions
 Carmen Ilizarbe, ‘El gobierno de Ollanta Humala y el discurso sobre los pueblos indígenas’
(), available at servindi.org/actualidad/.
 Carlos Iván Degregori (ed.), No hay país más diverso. Compendio de antropología peruana
(Lima: Red para el Desarrollo de las Ciencias Sociales en el Perú, ).
 On the increasing self-identiﬁcation of Andean ‘peasants’ and ‘peasant organisations’ as in-
digenous, partly as a strategy for defending their rights against extraction projects, see Donna
L. Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), p. ; Claire Wright and Salvador Martí i
Puig, ‘Conﬂicts Over Natural Resources and Activation of Indigenous Identity in Cusco,
Peru’, Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, :  (), pp. –.
 Such as the pejorative use of the terms ‘indio’ or ‘indigenous’, the ‘campesinisation’ of in-
digenous people as part of the  agrarian reform and the terrible eﬀects of Peru’s armed
internal conﬂict against Shining Path. The consequences of this internal war were assassina-
tions, the destruction of social organisations, the recruitment of community members by the
army or the guerrillas and massive urban migration, all of which especially aﬀected Andean
Quechua-speaking community members. See Van Cott, FromMovements to Parties; Deborah
Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the
Postliberal Challenge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ); Degregori, No hay
país más diverso.
 Gaventa, ‘Towards Participatory Governance’, p. .
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capable of justly balancing the interests of diverse groups, () measures that
reduce power asymmetries within consultations, and () joint decision-
making processes with binding agreements. Especially in the context of
expanding extractive industries in Latin America, we observe both power rela-
tions that clearly limit the decision-making power of indigenous peoples as
well as strong disincentives for adopting participatory governance. Our
ﬁndings thus connect to previous research about deﬁciencies in the area of citi-
zenship rights – especially those of the poor, indigenous peoples and minorities
– in Latin American practices, despite the increasing existence of de jure rights
in the region.
While the analysis of Peru is particularly revealing in relation to the study of
contestations over the design and implementation of prior consultation, our
ﬁndings are also of relevance beyond the country’s frontiers – as many neigh-
bouring countries are also struggling with their obligation to implement the
right to prior consultation and to FPIC. Moreover, countries like Bolivia,
Ecuador, Colombia and Mexico are currently in the process of crafting legis-
lation concerning such consultation.
We base our analysis on data collected during various ﬁeld research trips to
Peru between October  and December . The ﬁrst author participated
as an observer in the consultation on the consultation law’s regulating decree.
The second author had previously completed a research project on the devel-
opment of Peru’s Law on Prior Consultation, as part of which she systema-
tised the respective information for the Peruvian Ombudsman. Since the
promulgation of the Peruvian consultation legislation, she has carried out
ﬁeld research in ongoing consultation processes in the Peruvian Amazon. The
article’s data originate from semi-structured interviews with state and indigen-
ous representatives: Peruvian scholars and representatives of non-governmental
organisations: from the researchers’ roles as participatory observers; from the col-
lection of draft proposals for both this law and its decree; and from related state-
ments from a wide range of both public and private actors. We analysed the data
with the support of ATLAS.ti. After a short outline of the theoretical framework
we applied, the article describes the contentious processes that led to the adop-
tion of the new legislation, then presents the legislation’s content and the cri-
tiques that it has elicited. A subsequent analytical section examines the
absence of basic conditions for participatory governance and conﬂict transform-
ation. The article’s conclusions follow.
 See Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and some Conceptual Problems:
A Latin American View with Glances at some Postcommunist Countries’, World
Development, :  (), pp. –; Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (eds.),
Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, ); Rachel Sieder, ‘Pueblos indígenas y derecho(s) en
América Latina’, in Cesár Rodríguez Garavito (ed.), El derecho en América Latina
(Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, ), pp. –.
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Prior Consultation, Participatory Governance and Conﬂict Transformation
In order to analyse prior consultation’s potential to contribute to conﬂict
transformation, we draw on participatory governance literature. In so doing,
we connect two academic debates (on conﬂict transformation and on partici-
patory governance) which have in the past mainly developed separately. As we
outline below, these debates overlap in their common interest in agency, espe-
cially that of marginalised groups, and the transformation of unjust institu-
tional and structural orders.
The deﬁnition of conﬂict transformation that underlies this article goes
back to authors such as Lederach and Galtung. Scholars of conﬂict trans-
formation proceed on the assumption that violent conﬂicts should be trans-
formed into ‘constructive non-violent tensions’ with the aim of overcoming
exploitative and oppressive relationships. According to this view, conﬂicts
and contestations hold the creative potential to make grievances visible and
can lead to important societal changes. For example, Lederach deﬁnes
conﬂict transformation in the following way: ‘Conﬂict transformation is to
envision and respond to the ebb and ﬂow of social conﬂict as life-giving oppor-
tunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence,
increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-
life problems in human relationships’. Capacity building and the empower-
ment of marginalised groups as well as the fulﬁlment of basic human needs
are seen as necessary conditions for making such transformations possible.
The concepts participatory governance and participatory development are
both widely used, but scholars have interpreted them very diﬀerently depend-
ing on their general conceptions of development and participation as well as
their underlying normative assumptions. Drawing on Hickey and Mohan,
our own usage of this term distances itself from the narrow focus, which per-
vades mainstream development thinking and research, on participation as a
technical method of project work. Instead, we share with these authors a
 See John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conﬂict Transformation Across Cultures
(New York: Syracuse University Press, ) and Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means:
Peace and Conﬂict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage, ).
 Ronald McCarthy and Gene Sharp, Nonviolent Action. A Research Guide (New York and
London: Garland, ), p. xvi.
 John Paul Lederach, ‘Deﬁning Conﬂict Transformation’, Restorative Justice Online, available
at www.restorativejustice.org/fulltext/lederach.
 Cordula Reimann, ‘Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conﬂict Transformation’, in: Alex
Austin, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conﬂict
(Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, ), p. .
 See Sam Hickey and Giles Mohan, ‘Towards Participation as Transformation: Critical
Themes and Challenges’, in Hickey and Mohan (eds.), Participation, pp. –.
 See Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari (eds.), Participation. The New Tyranny (London and
New York: Zedbooks, ) and Glyn Williams, ‘Evaluating Participatory Development:
Tyranny, Power and (Re)Politicisation’, Third World Quarterly :  (), pp. –.
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political sense of agency; that is, we focus not only on the local but also on
wider structures of injustice and oppression, and on power relations that
enable or limit emancipatory participation (potentially including alternative
development paths) as well as rights-based development approaches.
In particular, Hickey and Mohan have asked under which conditions par-
ticipatory development can establish a ‘legitimate and genuinely transforma-
tive approach to development’. One of their main suggestions is that
power relations should be made visible in the analysis of how individuals
(re)make rules and (re)constitute institutions and, conversely, how institutions
shape individual actions. Advocating a similar approach, Williams adds that
strengthening the poor’s bargaining power within these relations is critical in
order to make transformations possible. Moreover, scholars from this strand
have emphasised that transformation needs to reach beyond the local level and
also involve the individual, structural and institutional levels; that long-term
political projects are far more promising than one-oﬀ transformative events;
that the local level and the community level should not be conceived of as
self-evident and unproblematic social categories; and that not only an active
and engaged society but also a more responsive and eﬀective state is needed.
The article brings such debates about conﬂict transformation and participa-
tory governance into a dialogue with the empirical data collected with the aim
of scrutinising the limitations and potential of the new consultation legislation
in transforming socio-environmental conﬂicts. The literature on participatory
governance has inspired us to focus on the analysis of power relations and
helped us to formulate theory-guided and empirically grounded basic condi-
tions that are currently lacking in Peru but would be necessary to realise
prior consultation’s transformative potential.
The Long and Rocky Road towards the Adoption of Peru’s Consultation
Legislation
In September  newly elected President Humala, representing himself as
left-wing and nationalist, promulgated Peru’s consultation law (No. ).
The symbolism of this act was emphasised and celebrated in a public ceremony
attended by indigenous representatives in the province of Bagua, where violent
 Hickey and Mohan, ‘Towards Participation as Transformation’, p. .
 Hickey and Mohan, ‘Towards Participation as Transformation’, p. ; Gaventa, ‘Towards
Participatory Governance’; Andrea Cornwall, ‘Spaces for Transformation? Reﬂections on
Issues of Power and Diﬀerence in Participation in Development’, in Hickey and Mohan
(eds.), Participation, pp. –.
 Glyn Williams, ‘Towards a Repoliticization of Participatory Development: Political
Capabilities and Spaces of Empowerment’, in Hickey and Mohan (eds.), Participation,
pp. –.
 See Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke, ‘Participatory Development and Empowerment: The
Dangers of Localism’, Third World Quarterly, :  (), pp. –.
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clashes between indigenous protesters and police forces had occurred in 
(see below). The new government wanted to demonstrate its break with the
neoliberal political agenda that had been pursued by predecessor Alan García
and had been characterised by open disrespect for indigenous rights. But while
the consultation law was unanimously passed by Congress, and initially also
widely supported by all national indigenous organisations as well as leading
Peruvian non-governmental organisations, the indigenous organisations have
since largely withdrawn their formal support of the law and lobbied for its
modiﬁcation in favour of a stronger interpretation of indigenous participatory
rights. We argue that to understand the social meaning of the consultation
law it is necessary to look at its history, its content, and the ways in which it has
been contested.
From rising protests …
Although Peru ratiﬁed ILO C in , it has failed to implement the right
to prior consultation. Prior consultations have been either entirely absent or
incomplete, with information events arranged by the oil or mining companies
themselves. Such events have generally been carried out in a standardised,
unilateral and superﬁcial manner, without attention being paid to diverse loca-
lised forms of knowledge, organisation, epistemologies and ethical universes.
These participatory processes have not ensured that the indigenous perspec-
tives have been taken into account, and their documentation has not been
made publicly accessible.
Indigenous rights lawyer Vladimir Pinto, with regard to public participation
in the licensing of a new oil spot in the Amazon, has noted that
the process was directed by the interested corporation and Perupetro. At the beginning
they distributed caps and shirts, gave food to the people, explained the advantages of
the project […]. There was not a moment of information about the project as a
problem or as something that the participants could analyse; it was just propaganda. 
 Just as he did in his presidential campaign of , during his  electoral campaign,
Ollanta Humala attracted the majority of indigenous and peasant votes. On ethnic voting
in Peru and for a detailed analysis of Humala’s  campaign see Raúl Madrid, ‘Ethnic
Proximity and Ethnic Voting in Peru’, Journal of Latin American Studies,  (),
pp. –.
 But note that despite their critique of the consultation legislation (as further detailed in this
article), recent consultation experiences have shown that indigenous organisations are willing
to participate in prior consultations under the current legal framework.
 Alejandra Alayza Moncloa, No pero sí. Comunidades y minería. Consulta y consentimiento
previo, libre e informado en el Perú (Lima: CooperAcción, ); Tami Okamoto and
Esben Leifsen, ‘Oil Spills, Contamination, and Unruly Engagements with Indigenous
Peoples in the Peruvian Amazon’, in Havard Haarstad, New Political Spaces in Latin
American Natural Resource Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, ), pp. –.
 Interview with Vladimir Pinto, Lima, Jan. .
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Mining expert José de Echave has also criticised previous participation pro-
cesses regarding mining activities:
We saw several of these events and, truly, they were miserable. […] They were exclu-
sively controlled by the private company; it convened, organised, and decided who
could enter and who could not […]. In the best case the events were purely inform-
ative, but in general they did not even comply with its informative function. 
The absence of meaningful consultation has taken centre stage in the debates
surrounding extractive industries in Peru. The gap has been partly ﬁlled with
self-organised anti-mining events and referenda. The ﬁrst such referendum, a
precedent for other community referenda in Peru and beyond, took place in
Tambogrande, where the Canadian company Manhattan Minerals had
extracted minerals without prior consultation since . In , the
aﬀected local communities held a referendum and  per cent of all voters
took part;  per cent of them rejected the mine. The central government
did not accept this result, but the opposition to the project caused the
mining company to abandon it. A similar referendum, in which the great ma-
jority ( per cent) of the local population rejected the mining project, was held
about the Río Blanco/Majaz project in the Piura region after violent conﬂicts in
. Again, the government did not recognise the vote, but because the con-
gress intervened, the mine’s operations were suspended. Legal claims of human
rights violations against the company resulted in the (at least temporary) closure
of the mine. In the political and legal contests about these and many other
socio-environmental conﬂicts in Peru, the indigenous demand to implement
rights to prior consultation and to FPIC has played a prominent role.
Socio-environmental conﬂicts in the Andean and Amazon regions have
increased in quantity and intensity since . While the Peruvian ombuds-
man registered  social conﬂicts in June , this number had increased to
 conﬂicts six years later, with  of the latter characterised as socio-
environmental in nature. Many of the indigenous protests that emerged
were a reaction to President García’s implementation of neoliberal policies
and privatisation programmes aiming to attract foreign investment to
promote the further expansion of the extractive and agricultural industries.
 Interview with José de Echave, Lima, Feb. .
 Anthony Bebbington and Mark Williams, ‘Water and Mining Conﬂicts in Peru’,Mountain
Research and Development, : / (), p. .
 See Javier Arellano Yanguas, Minería sin fronteras? Conﬂicto y desarrollo en regiones mineras
del Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, ).
 Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, ‘Conﬂictos sociales conocidos por la Defensoría del Pueblo.
Al  de Junio de . Reporte No. ’ and Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, ‘Reporte de
Conﬂictos Sociales No. . Junio ’, available at www.defensoria.gob.pe/temas.php?
des=#r.
 The area of the Peruvian Amazon covered by hydrocarbon blocks increased from  per cent
in  to  per cent in  (María del Rosario Sevillano Arévalo, El derecho a la consulta
de los pueblos indígenas en el Perú (Lima: DAR, ), p. . Moreover, more than half of all
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Amazonian and Andean communities alike mobilised against the environmen-
tal pollution caused by extractive industries and for more eﬀective models of
decision-making and beneﬁt-sharing. In a programmatic article in Peru’s
leading newspaper, García denounced his critics, and especially the indigenous
protesters, as ‘dogs in the manger’ who were unable or unwilling to use the
country’s resources and thus prevented others from doing so. He argued
that the ‘dead capital’ had to be turned into economic growth and that
anyone opposed to this was a ‘backward enemy’ of Peru’s development.
Further conﬂicts arose after President García used temporary legal powers to
adapt Peru’s legislation to the Free Trade Agreement concluded with the
United States, eﬀective from . In , he passed nearly  legislative
decrees without prior consultation, some of which included earlier draft
laws that had been vetoed in Congress. In August , indigenous organisa-
tions and local communities, supported by human rights and environmental
organisations, mobilised against the decrees by blockading important high-
ways, waterways and oil pipelines throughout the Peruvian Amazon. Their
main focus became the derogation of  decrees directly aﬀecting their liveli-
hoods. The government consequently declared a state of emergency in several
Amazonian districts. An escalation of the conﬂict could only be avoided
through the intervention of the Peruvian ombudsman, an important actor
throughout the whole process. This led the Congress to rescind two of the con-
tested decrees on  August .
To delegitimise his critics, President García accused local media, non-
governmental organisations and ‘leftist powers’ of instigating the protests. In
April  a second nation-wide strike began as a result of the government’s
decision to postpone the revision of the remaining contested decrees despite
the fact that Congress had recommended their derogation. After a month
of blockades, the government again declared a state of emergency in various
Amazonian districts. The conﬂict escalated on  June  when the national
police force dispersed a peaceful highway blockade of approximately ,
peasant communities in Peru are estimated to currently be aﬀected by mining activities
(Bebbington and Williams, ‘Water and Mining Conﬂicts’, p. ).
 See José de Echave, Alejandro Diez, Ludwig Huber, Bruno Revesz, Xavier Ricard Lanata y
Martín Tanaka, Minería y conﬂicto social (Lima: CBC/CIPCA/CIES/IEP, );
Anthony Bebbington and Denise Humphreys Bebbington, ‘An Andean Avatar: Post-
neoliberal and Neoliberal Strategies for Promoting Extractive Industries’, BWPI Working
Paper,  ().
 Alan García, ‘El síndrome del perro del hortelano’, El Comercio ( Oct. ). For more
details see George Stetson, ‘Oil Politics and Indigenous Resistance in the Peruvian
Amazon: The Rhetoric of Modernity Against the Reality of Coloniality’, The Journal of
Environment & Development, :  (), pp. –.
 Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR), Informe. Hechos y aspectos vulneratorios de
los Decretos Legislativos  y  (Lima: DAR, ), pp. , .
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protesters near the city of Bagua. The same day  policemen were killed by
furious protesters. In total, the Baguazo left at least  people dead, 
injured and  under arrest.
In contrast to his intentions, García’s aggressive discourse actually resulted
in increasing public solidarity with the indigenous protests. A new strike
announced by the Amazonian indigenous organisation Asociación
Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Interethnic Association for
the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest, AIDESEP) was joined by
more than , protesters in Lima demanding the investigation of the
events in Bagua and the establishment of political responsibilities. Partly
due to the alliances formed with the Amazonian organisations in the previous
few years, the Andean movements increasingly came to recognise themselves as
‘indigenous’ and thus jointly struggled for the enshrinement of their rights as
indigenous peoples. The indigenous organisations were also able to establish
new networks with trade unions and the political opposition, as well as with
human rights and environmental organisations, which provided them with
ample organisational resources as well as expertise in legal matters. Finally,
Peru’s government was also put under pressure to handle the conﬂicts more
eﬀectively by ﬁnancial and business actors aﬀected by the blockades, and, as
the uprisings were linked to the recently signed Free Trade Agreement, the
United States government closely observed the Peruvian state’s actions.
On  June  the Grupo Nacional de Coordinación para el Desarrollo
de los Pueblos Amazónicos (National Coordination Group for the
Development of Amazonian Peoples, GNCDPA) was created by the
Council of Ministers to institutionalise a forum for dialogue. The aim of
this group was to formulate an integral plan for the development priorities
of the Amazonian indigenous peoples. The Baguazo had not only drawn na-
tional attention to indigenous issues but had also led to severe international
criticism from bodies such as the United Nations. The UN special rapporteur
on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, oﬀered to mediate the
conﬂict and visited Peru after the conﬂict escalated. In general, at various
stages during these contentious episodes external authorities supported the
 Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, Informe de Adjuntía N° --DP/ADHPD. Actuaciones
humanitarias realizadas por la Defensoría del Pueblo con ocasión de los hechos ocurridos el  de
Junio del  (Lima: Defensoría del Pueblo,  July ).
 Alberto Villar Campos, ‘Tensa marcha bloqueó el Cercado’, El Comercio ( June ),
p. .
 On the nascent alliance between Amazonian and Andean representatives under an indigen-
ous banner see Shane Greene, ‘Getting over the Andes: The Geo-Eco-Politics of Indigenous
Movements in Peru’s Twenty-First Century Inca Empire’, Journal of Latin American Studies,
 (), pp. –.
 The GNCDPA was presided over by the minister of agriculture and was comprised of gov-
ernment oﬃcials from other ministries, members of regional governments and representa-
tives of Amazonian communities.
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claims of the indigenous movements, strengthening their demand for the im-
plementation of the right to prior consultation. García eventually admitted
that adopting the decrees without prior consultation and his government’s
handling of the Baguazo were a mistake. On  June , Congress
revoked two of the contested decrees. The state of emergency was lifted and
blockades ended.
… to negotiations …
With the end of this acute conﬂict, a dialogue phase between the government
and indigenous organisations began, but it was not without severe drawbacks.
Although the government had withdrawn the decrees and ended the state of
emergency, the political and judicial persecution of indigenous leaders contin-
ued. AIDESEP’s leader, Alberto Pizango, even left Peru for Nicaragua as a pol-
itical refugee. In this tense atmosphere Working Group  (Mesa ) of the
GNCDPA had to develop a draft law on prior consultation, which was
based on a proposal presented by the ombudsman on  July .
The draft law, which was based on the original version, increased the
number of articles from  to . While this ﬁnal document included
some substantial agreements, it still highlighted  issues on which no agree-
ment had been reached between indigenous and government representatives.
The ﬁnal draft document was submitted to the various Andean organisations
for comment. These organisations placed special emphasis on the fact that
the term ‘indigenous peoples’ should explicitly include peasant communities.
They also stressed the need to make agreements reached during consultation
processes legally binding, and that the state institution(s) responsible for carry-
ing out these consultation processes would have to be autonomous.
The more detailed draft law was submitted to Congress on  April . After
heated discussions between the governing party and the opposition, a much
shorter consultation law ( articles) was ﬁnally passed on  May . For
 Cecilia Rosales and Déborah Dongo, ‘Mejor rectiﬁcar que obstinarse’, El Comercio ( June
), p. .
 The Mesa  was to set up a commission to investigate the events in Bagua, while Mesa  was
in charge of discussing the contested decrees and developing a proposal to improve the for-
estry legislation. Mesa  had the task of negotiating a development plan for the Amazon.
 The indigenous organisations did approve the ombudsman’s proposal, but they criticised the
fact that it had not been developed with indigenous participation from the beginning.
 GNCDPA, Informe ﬁnal de la Mesa . Sobre el derecho a la consulta (Dec. ), available at
servindi.org/pdf/Mesa_Dialogo_.pdf.
 The Confederación Campesina del Perú (Peasant Confederation of Peru, CCP) the
Confederación Nacional Agraria (National Agrarian Confederation, CNA), and
the Confederación Nacional de Comunidades del Perú Afectadas por la Minería
(National Confederation of Communities Aﬀected by Mining, CONACAMI).
 See www.servindi.org/pdf/Peru_OrgInd_PyConsulta.pdf.
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nearly all of the contested issues, members of the governing party and its allies
either imposed their own vision or the respective provisions were kept vague.
Despite the limited nature of the law adopted by the Congress, the Amazonian
and Andean indigenous organisations still advocated its rapid promulgation, con-
sidering this the best outcome they could achieve at that moment in time.
The Peruvian president, however, vetoed the law and sent it back to
Congress on  June  with a list of objections. He wanted the law to
clearly indicate that ‘national interests’ was the single most important criterion
for governmental decisions and argued that the peasant communities of the
Andes and the coastal region should not be granted the right to prior consult-
ation because he did not consider them to be indigenous. Furthermore, he
stated that only communities with registered land titles should be consulted.
These objections were not consistent with the ILO C and resulted in new
protests in October and December of . The consultation law was not
debated again in Congress under García’s government, particularly because at
that time the political parties were focused on their campaigns for the upcom-
ing elections. In addition, AIDESEP lost political inﬂuence after the Baguazo as
it was weakened by legal persecution and the creation of parallel organisations.
 Meanwhile, its leader, Alberto Pizango, was focused on his presidential can-
didacy after his return from exile in Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the consultation
law remained a crucial issue in public debates during the election campaign.
…ﬁnally leading to Peru’s consultation legislation
In September  Peru’s new president, Ollanta Humala, promulgated the
consultation law following its unanimous adoption in Congress.
 For example, the indigenous organisations demanded their right to FPIC, especially when
planned measures would directly aﬀect their territory, require their resettlement or
concern the storage of hazardous waste. Provisions specifying the right to prior consent
were completely taken out of the law. Another element of the original law’s proposal that
was subsequently excluded was the stipulation that preparatory meetings to jointly plan
the consultation process should be obligatory.
 Presidente de la República del Perú, Oﬁcio N° –-DP/SCM. Observaciones a la
autógrafa de la ‘Ley del derecho a la consulta previa a los pueblos indigenas u originarios reco-
nocido en el Convenio Num.  de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo’ ( June ),
available at www.servindi.org/pdf/Observaciones_LeyConsulta.pdf.
 Meanwhile, the disputes also reverberated in the judicial ﬁeld. On  June  the constitu-
tional court declared in a decision about several of the contested decrees that the
non-existence of a Peruvian consultation law did not justify the non-application of prior con-
sultations (Sentencia –, Tribunal Constitucional,  June ). On  June  the
court even directly requested that the congress approve the consultation law as soon as possible
(Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional, EXP. N° --PC/TC,  June ).
 See Alberto Chirif, ‘Auges y caíadas de las organizaciones indígenas’, in Stefano Varese,
Frédérique Apﬀel-Marglin and Roger Rumrrill (eds.), Selva vida. De la destrucción de la
Amazonía al paradigma de la regeneración (Lima: IWGIA, ), pp. –.
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Subsequently, Humala’s government carried out a meta-consultation on its
regulating decree. While the indigenous organisations initially hoped that
the decree might correct the main deﬁciencies of the consultation law, ‘power-
ful extractive corporations’ lobbied the state ministries to adopt a norm that
would further restrict the indigenous rights contained in the law.
The meta-consultation consisted of two periods: during the ﬁrst period, re-
ferred to as the phase of ‘internal deliberation’, six nation-wide indigenous and
peasant organisations were convoked by the Vice-Ministry of Intercultural
Relations to six regional meetings and one ﬁnal national meeting (each of a
duration of two days). During a second phase, the indigenous organisations
were to meet with the relevant vice-ministries in a ‘multi-sectorial commis-
sion’ and negotiate the identiﬁed contested issues concerning the draft
decree. The consultation about the decree, however, was marked by serious
deﬁciencies, which are likely to hinder future consultations as well.
First, the multi-sectorial commission that was installed on  November
 with the task of formulating the decree comprised a total of  vice-
ministers but the representatives of only six indigenous organisations. The
commission’s composition was criticised due to this imbalance between
state and indigenous representatives. Moreover, some organisations operating
at the regional and local levels raised complaints about their exclusion from the
process.
Second, the time frame for carrying out the consultation process was very
short and the indigenous organisations did not have enough time to debate
the draft decree prepared by the Vice-Ministry of Intercultural Relations
with their aﬃliated communities. The information about the consultation
law and the draft decree was only distributed at the beginning of each
event, so that participants did not have the opportunity to analyse it
beforehand.
Third, subtle mechanisms reinforced the asymmetrical character of the pro-
cedure. For example, the predominant language style within the meetings, even
the ones that were part of the ‘internal deliberation’, was rather technical and
legalistic. The conditions for a genuine intercultural dialogue, one charac-
terised by diverse communication repertoires, knowledge forms, values and
logics, were missing. The indigenous and peasant representatives generally
harked back to legal arguments to validate their points of view. It is doubtful
 Interview with de Echave.
 Among the indigenous organisations represented were the two Amazonian indigenous orga-
nisations AIDESEP and Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú
(Confederation of the Amazonian Nationalities of Peru, CONAP), the women’s organisa-
tion Organización Nacional de Mujeres Andinas y Amazónicas del Perú (National
Organisation of Andean and Amazonian Women of Peru, ONAMIAP) and the three
Andean indigenous-peasant organisations CONACAMI, CNA and CCP.
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that they would have been taken seriously if they had brought forward radically
diﬀerent perspectives.
Fourth, although ﬁve of the indigenous organisations had formed a ‘Unity
Pact’ and formulated a document on the ‘minimal principles’ that should
guide the new legislation on prior consultation, the consultation meetings
highlighted two areas of tension: the ﬁssions between and within diverse indi-
genous groups and representational deﬁcit of the national indigenous and
peasant organisations. The ombudsman’s staﬀ accompanying the process
reported,
the consultation meetings have shown that within the concept ‘indigenous’ you ﬁnd
many groups with totally diﬀerent interests. […] The Amazonian indigenous groups –
within this group there are many diﬀerent groups. The same is true of the Aymaras,
the Quechuas, the coastal groups. […] During the consultation process the issue
that no national organisation has a close link with its base was also clearly apparent.
The problems made evident were Who represents whom? How do they represent us?
What happens when you do not feel represented?
The divergence of the indigenous groups and organisations became especially
visible during the regional meetings in Cusco and Loreto. At the Huancayo
regional meeting the participants even decided to work in two separate
groups, one with Amazonian and one with Andean participants. According
to Van Cott, compared to neighbouring countries, the division between
Amazonian and Andean indigenous peoples is particularly pronounced in
Peru, where the two groups have received diﬀerent legal treatment and orga-
nised themselves separately. The representational deﬁcit of the participating
organisations became evident as several regional and local groups stated that
they did not feel represented by the invited organisations. In addition, many
decisions taken by the organisations’ leaders (for example, about the schedule
of each consultation meeting) were criticised by their base during the events.
The Unity Pact succeeded only temporarily in formulating common claims
towards the state. When the actual meta-consultation began, the competition
between and diﬀerent interests of the various national organisations, as well as
their internal problems, became more virulent again.
 Pacto de Unidad, ‘Principios mínimos para la aplicación de los derechos de participación,
consulta previa y consentimiento libre, previo e informado’ (Lima,  Nov. ).
 Group interview with ombudsman’s staﬀ, Lima, Feb. .
 Van Cott, From Movements to Parties, p. .
 On the national level various indigenous organisations compete for aﬃliates and representa-
tiveness. For example, AIDESEP and CONAP compete to represent a wide range of
Amazonian communities, while CAN, CCP and CONACAMI are in dispute over
inﬂuence within and representation of highland peasant communities. For an overview of
the historic emergence of indigenous organisations in Peru see, for example, Deborah
Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America and Lisa M. Glidden, Mobilizing Ethnic
Identities in the Andes: A Study of Ecuador and Peru (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, ).
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At the end of the national meeting in Lima, AIDESEP, CNA,
CONACAMI and ONAMIAP all publicly declared that they were not
willing to continue participating in the multi-sectorial commission until the
consultation law was modiﬁed or replaced. This decision was unsurprising,
as this standpoint had already been clearly expressed in all former subnational
meetings. It was justiﬁed by stating that the consultation law did not fully in-
corporate the proposals from Mesa , that it had not been discussed in an ad-
equate manner with the indigenous peoples and that it would set standards for
prior consultation that were below those established by ILO C. The
invited organisations also lost their initial hope that the decree would compen-
sate for the deﬁciencies in the consultation law. Only two organisations
decided that they would continue to be part of these negotiations: CCP
and CONAP.
The multi-sectorial commission, now composed of  vice-ministries and of
an indigenous and a peasant organisation, met six more times between  and
 February . When the work of the multi-sectorial commission con-
cluded,  points of disagreement still remained. On  of these points the ex-
ecutive ultimately imposed its own vision. In violation of the consultation law,
which stipulated that agreements achieved as a result of these consultations
were legally binding, the various ministries did not incorporate all of the agree-
ments reached into the decree. They also introduced  new provisions that
had not been previously discussed with the participating organisations. In
fact, several of these openly contradicted some of the Unity Pact’s ‘minimal
principles’.
Contestations over the Content of the New Consultation Legislation
The decree was ﬁnally published on  April . In contrast to the former
situation, wherein prior consultations were never implemented, the new con-
sultation legislation (law and decree) might potentially lead to improvements.
It has, at least, clariﬁed responsibilities, speciﬁed the procedures to be followed
and deﬁned some minimal standards that these proceedings should fulﬁl.
 CONAP’s representative expressed the organisation’s consensus that the consultation law
was not perfect but said that they would still try to craft a regulating norm to enrich and
further develop it. CCP’s decision was to support the formulation of the regulating decree
and, subsequently, to strive for some modiﬁcations to the consultation law.
 When CCP was founded in , its discourse was class-based rather than ethnicity-based,
despite the fact that it had many Quechua- and Aymara-speaking members. See Raúl Madrid,
The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ),
p. .
 See CNDDHH, Informe de observación del proceso de consulta previa del Reglamento de la Ley
del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los pueblos indígenas u originarios ( Sept. ), available
at www.servindi.org/actualidad/.
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However, the indigenous and peasant organisations have comprehensively cri-
tiqued the speciﬁc content of the new legislation. This critique will be brieﬂy
summarised here (for an overview see Table ). While the state has favoured
narrow participatory rights, including a narrow deﬁnition of the consultation
subjects and of the measures requiring consultation, a process led by the state,
and limited decision-making powers for the consulted groups, the indigenous
organisations had originally lobbied for more comprehensive rights.
Consultation subjects: Regarding the consultation subject, subjective and ob-
jective identiﬁcation criteria have been established in the consultation law. The
indigenous organisations oppose the list of objective criteria deﬁned by the na-
tional law, as these criteria are more restrictive than those established in ILO
C.  They fear that this deﬁnition could be used to deprive certain groups
of the right to prior consultation. Moreover, the consultation decree empha-
sises the role of the indigenous representatives. This is contrary to the proposal
made by the Unity Pact, which emphasised that: ‘decisions will only be valid
when taken by assemblies that guarantee broad, free and informed participa-
tion’. Similarly, the executive has introduced the stipulation that only the
representative organisations within the geographic area aﬀected by the
planned measure were to be consulted.
Measures to be consulted: The consultation law further states that only those
measures directly aﬀecting indigenous peoples are subject to prior consultation.
The indigenous organisations have claimed that the consultation obligation
should be expanded to also include those measures aﬀecting indigenous
peoples indirectly, especially in view of previous contestations about very
narrow deﬁnitions of ‘being aﬀected’. Moreover, much to the discontent
of the indigenous organisations, the consultation law declares that those mea-
sures adopted prior to its promulgation will not be revised in light of the new
legislation.
Responsible state institutions: The state institutions responsible for carrying out
the prior consultation are the ones in charge of each respective measure (for
example, the Ministry of Energy and Mines regarding new mining projects).
 The law establishes the following objective criteria: descent from original populations, close
ties to their historical territory, their own institutions, customs and cultural patterns and
ways of life that are distinct from those of the ‘national population’.
 Pacto de Unidad, ‘Principios mínimos’. The diﬀerence between representatives and repre-
sentative institutions is important, ﬁrst, because many Andean and Amazonian indigenous
communities and organisations take decisions in assemblies and do not delegate decision-
making power to selected representatives. Second, the requirement that decisions be
supported by inclusive assemblies could reduce the risk that single representatives will be per-
suaded or even corrupted.
 See Alayza Moncloa, No pero sí. In addition, the law and its decree provide for consultation
only on those measures that the state believes might negatively aﬀect indigenous peoples,
whereas ILO C provides for consultation on all measures that are likely to aﬀect indigen-
ous peoples, whether positively or negatively.
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Table . Consultation Legislation and the Main Critiques of It
Consultation Subject
Measures to Be
Consulted
Responsible State
Institutions Consultation Procedure Final Decision
Consultation
Law No. 
and
Consultation
Decree
➢ Andean or peasant
and Amazon or native
communities
➢ Objective criteria:
descent from aborigi-
nal populations; close
connections with
traditional territory;
own institutions and
customs; diﬀerent
culture and ways of
life
➢ Database to be created
by Vice-Ministry of
Intercultural
Relations
➢ Consultations with
representatives of dir-
ectly aﬀected indigen-
ous peoples from
geographic area
➢ Legislative and ad-
ministrative measures
as well as plans, pro-
grammes and projects
for national and re-
gional development
that directly aﬀect
collective rights
➢ Law does not change
or abrogate previous
measures
➢ Promoting entity of
planned measure is in
charge of implement-
ing consultations
➢ Vice-Ministry of
Intercultural
Relations assists
consultations
➢ Comprises the fol-
lowing: identiﬁcation
of measures and
aﬀected groups;
gathering of com-
plete information;
internal evaluation of
aﬀected populations;
dialogue with state
entities; decision-
making
➢ Promoting entity can
organise preparatory
meeting
➢ Maximum duration:
 days
➢ Agreements reached
are binding
➢ When no agreement
can be reached the
ﬁnal decision will be
taken by competent
authority. It must be
properly justiﬁed
and include an
evaluation of
expected impacts on
collective human
rights

C
on
ﬂict
T
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through
Prior
C
onsultation?
L
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from
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Table . Continued
Consultation Subject Measures to Be
Consulted
Responsible State
Institutions
Consultation Procedure Final Decision
Main Critique
from Indigenous
and Peasant
Organisations
➢ Objective criteria
from the consultation
law too stringent
➢ Creation of the data-
base without indigen-
ous participation
➢ The representative
institutions should be
consulted, not just the
representatives
themselves
➢ Representative organi-
sations from national,
regional and local
levels should be
invited
➢ Consultations should
also be carried out
about measures that
have indirect eﬀects
➢ Previous measures
should be revised
➢ Responsible entity for
implementing con-
sultations should be
the specialised entity
on indigenous issues,
with ministerial rank
and employing indi-
genous persons
➢ Provisions on how
the legislative branch
should enact consult-
ation are missing
➢ A pre-consultative
phase should be
obligatory
➢ The time frame
should be more
ﬂexible
➢ The design of the
consultation process
should be less
unilateral
➢ Doubts that respon-
sible state institu-
tions will protect
human rights and
justly balance diverse
interests
➢ The consultation le-
gislation should list
situations in which
FPIC is necessary
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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The specialised institution of the executive branch for indigenous issues, current-
ly the Vice-Ministry of Intercultural Aﬀairs, is supposed to support all consulta-
tions by coordinating state policies, assisting the responsible institutions and the
indigenous peoples, creating a database on indigenous peoples and their repre-
sentative institutions, providing a register of oﬃcial facilitators and translators,
and registering the results of the procedures (consultation law). Since this advis-
ory role for the vice-ministry means it has relatively little inﬂuence and decision-
making power, the indigenous organisations have opposed this solution. They
have demanded that the entity responsible for indigenous issues should carry
out and not just support prior consultation. Moreover, they have claimed that
this entity should have the rank of a ministry and that indigenous persons
should be included among the entity’s employees.
Consultation procedure: The consultation procedure established by the new
consultation legislation is likely to contribute to further asymmetrical consult-
ation practices in future (with signiﬁcant power imbalances operating to the
disadvantage of the consulted groups). For example, no pre-consultative
phase for the joint planning of the consultation procedure, as foreseen
within the Mesa  proposal, is obligatory. Instead, the decree stipulates that
the entity in charge should design the consultation plan and then communi-
cate it to the communities chosen by the entity to be engaged. The whole
consultation process can last for up to a maximum of  days. The indigenous
organisations would have preferred a more ﬂexible scheme.
Final decision: The law and the decree establish that the agreements reached
are binding. The credibility of this stipulation is questionable, though, since it
had already been violated during the consultation process about the decree. In
cases where no agreement on the planned measure can be reached within the
consultation, the consultation law and the decree both establish that the lead
state entity will take the ﬁnal decision. This decision should be suﬃciently
justiﬁed in order to guarantee the protection of the rights of the people
involved and balance the diverse interests at stake. The indigenous organisa-
tions have, however, understandable doubts about whether this will actually
happen.
The document on the ‘minimal principles’ of the Unity Pact underscored
that prior consultations shall be prohibited when the planned measure would
undermine the rights of the aﬀected groups or persons. It also envisioned
 According to the legislation, indigenous organisations and communities can request to be
included in an ongoing consultation process. This happened in  during Peru’s ﬁrst con-
sultation, which was on the Maijuna regional conservation area in Loreto.
 The indigenous standpoint could be supported by Masaki’s ﬁnding that ‘practitioners of
social change should avoid imposing a linear and continuous notion of “calendar time”
on to the “practical time” within which negotiations over power relations operate’
(Katsuhiko Masaki, ‘Towards Participation as Transformation: Critical Themes and
Challenges’, in Hickey and Mohan (eds.), Participation, p. ).
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situations in which not only prior consultation with but also the FPIC of the
consulted groups should be made obligatory, among them projects that would
negatively aﬀect sources of subsistence or indigenous property rights, as well as
military activities. The indigenous vision shines through this document, dem-
onstrating that indigenous peoples see consultations as mechanisms that not
only enable them to participate and be heard, but that also secure their
rights and bring about actual material improvements. Apart from some wea-
kened fragments, not many of these ‘minimal principles’ have yet been incor-
porated into the decree. This is something which might represent a major
obstacle to its future implementation.
Unresolved Tensions and Starting Points for Conﬂict Transformation
The analysis of the background to and the content of the new consultation
legislation, and the contestation that it elicited, reveals the divergent views
regarding state-indigenous relations, the development paths desired, and legit-
imate forms of participation and decision-making. The legal-institutional
design of prior consultation remains highly contested, and the absence of a
consensus about ground rules is likely to exacerbate social conﬂicts in the
future. In addition, it can be expected that concrete future practices will
diverge from the formal stipulations as political actors respond to a mix of
formal and informal incentives. Indeed, the mutual distrust between the
state and indigenous peoples resulting from a history of discrimination and ex-
ploitation, combined with the great power asymmetries between the state and
extractive corporations on one side and the indigenous peoples on the other,
will continue to hinder the implementation of an egalitarian ‘intercultural dia-
logue’. It is also very likely that divergent notions of development, territory,
decision-making and society-nature relations between diﬀerent local popula-
tions and the state will contribute to a lack of mutual understanding and to
diﬃculty identifying culturally appropriate solutions.
The study presented above provides evidence of unfavourable power asym-
metries which exist within state institutions and in relations between the state
and indigenous peoples, and which are manifested in the content of the new
consultation legislation. The latter not only reﬂects the interests of the state
and extractive companies to a greater extent than those of the locally
aﬀected populations but will also likely further exacerbate such power asym-
metries in future consultations. We argue that in order to turn consultation
 North cit. after Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, ‘Introduction’, in Helmke and
Levitsky (eds.), Informal Institutions and Democracy, p. .
 On diverging state and indigenous views see, for example, Marisol de la Cadena, ‘Indigenous
Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reﬂections beyond “Politics”’, Cultural
Anthropology, :  (), pp. –.
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into an eﬀective tool for conﬂict transformation, such unfavourable power
relations must be challenged. Without strengthening the bargaining power
of aﬀected communities and without the state becoming more responsive, re-
source conﬂicts are unlikely to be transformed in Peru in the near future.
While we are aware that this diﬃcult task cannot be accomplished by adopting
new laws alone, change is even less likely if there is legislation in place that sus-
tains the status quo.
Given the current legal and political circumstances, consultation practices
will most likely be ‘pseudo-democratic instruments through which authorities
legitimise already-taken policy decisions’ rather than accepted instruments of
conﬂict transformation, which are especially needed in the context of increas-
ing resource extraction. In this sense, we agree with César Gamboa when he
remarks:
You can identify several institutions that debilitate consultation processes. Why?
Because they do not want to change the rules of the game. Meaningful consultation
means changing the rules of the game, of the investments. But the consultation legis-
lation and the state functionaries will not allow this. […] Therefore, there will be some
conﬂicts; the people will get angry about not being taken into account and there will
be more conﬂicts.
In this context, prior consultation will probably not be a tool for conﬂict trans-
formation but may instead provoke disempowerment and diverse forms of re-
sistance by local populations. It may even fuel violent conﬂicts. It is to be
expected that in future consultations, disputes about design and implementa-
tion will hinder deliberations on the planned measures, despite the fact that
the latter are the actual objects of consultation.
Thus, and as we explain in more detail below, the conﬂict risk is particularly
accentuated when biased state institutions intersect with great power
asymmetries:
Why do communities choose contentious politics as a strategy? The short answer is
that they perceive this as the only means left open to them if they are to negotiate
on a more or less equal footing with companies. This perception is fostered by the
clear asymmetry of power between communities and companies, and the widespread
public suspicion of collusion between the state and the mining companies.
 Cornwall, ‘Spaces for Transformation?’, p. .
 Interview with César Gamboa, Executive Director of the Peruvian NGO Derecho Ambiente y
Recursos Naturales (DAR), Lima, Feb. .
 On subtle forms of resistance see James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of
Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, ).
 Javier Arellano Yanguas, ‘Mining and conﬂict in Peru’, in Anthony Bebbington (ed.), Social
Conﬂict, Economic Development and Extractive Industry. Evidence from South America
(New York: Routledge, ), p. .
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Unfavourable power asymmetries within the state
During the contentious process of adopting the new consultation legislation,
criticism of current state institutions, perceived as biased towards corporate
interests and hostile to indigenous ones, came to light. The demand for the
reform of state institutions to be more representative of indigenous peoples
and their perspectives was a core issue within Mesa , as well as during the
meta-consultation on the decree. As prior consultations should not only
protect the rights of those who might be aﬀected by the measure(s) planned
but also justly balance the diverse interests involved, indigenous organisations
claimed that the entity in charge of implementing them should be strong and
should counterbalance the existing power asymmetries within the Peruvian
state. Thus, they demanded that an upgraded and multiculturally composed
version of the existing state entity specialised in indigenous issues should be
responsible for prior consultations and not, as the new consultation legislation
envisioned, the promoting entity. As we have seen, the indigenous organisa-
tions have good cause to expect the latter to simply press ahead with the
planned measure in question. The government has, however, disregarded
this demand and has instead continued to insist that the promoting entity
is to be the responsible state institution. The absence of an institution per-
ceived as being legitimate will cause suspicion, distrust and feelings of exclusion
on the part of the communities consulted, potentially creating the conditions
for disempowerment, discontent and/or serious (violent) conﬂict.
But, our power analysis should not stop here, as the state institution respon-
sible for carrying out prior consultations does not act in a political vacuum.
Instead, it is part of the wider power relations that shape the Peruvian state.
Within the Peruvian state there has been considerable diversity among individ-
ual actors and groups more or less sympathetic towards indigenous claims, for
example, in the diﬀerent commissions within the legislative branch, within the
diﬀerent political parties and within diﬀerent ministries. This diversity,
however, has been accompanied by signiﬁcant power asymmetries in the
sense that the forces that lobby for environmental and rights protection in
the context of resource extraction are weak in the Peruvian state, while eco-
nomic forces clearly predominate.
To name but one example, the Ministry of Environment, created in ,
‘in theory should be the national environmental authority, but in practice it is
not. We say that the Environment Ministry is only painted on the wall: it is
there, but it does not count. In practice, each ministry is the environmental
 See also Anthony Bebbington, Martin Scurrah and Claudia Bielich, Los movimientos sociales y
la política de la pobreza en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, ), pp. ﬀ. In
their study of the Río Corrientes case, the authors show the diversity within the state appar-
atus, but generally characterise the Peruvian state as ‘clientelist, authoritarian, bureaucratic
and counter-productive’ (ibid., p. ).
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authority of its sector.’ Similarly, the obligatory Environmental Impact
Assessments (EIAs) are ordered and paid for by the corporations themselves.
So long as it exists, this unfavourable institutional constellation will probably
continue to reinforce the widespread perception that corporate and state inter-
ests are intertwined in Peru.
Power asymmetries between the state and indigenous peoples
We have shown that one of the main reasons for the discontent of the partici-
pants in the meta-consultation has been its unilateral and asymmetrical character.
The participants have been selected by the executive and the proceedings have not
been conducted in a way that the Peruvian indigenous and peasant organisations
agreed with. Time pressure and delayed dissemination of relevant information
have constrained possibilities for comprehensive internal deliberation within
the participating organisations and for genuine intercultural dialogue.
With regard to consultations about planned extractive projects at the local
level, we can expect that the unilateral and asymmetrical character will be even
more accentuated, thereby causing disempowerment and discontent and ex-
acerbating conﬂicts between the state and the local populations, as well as divi-
sions within the aﬀected groups themselves. Many such future processes will
take place in ‘brown areas’, indigenous communities that are characterised
by ‘low-intensity citizenship’ and the ‘unrule of law’. Moreover, the indi-
genous organisations’ lack of representativeness and internal conﬂicts, which
we discussed above, will probably also hinder meaningful participation at
the local level. In contrast to the style of consultation analysed at the national
level, the representative institutions involved in these localised cases will tend
to be weaker, having even less access to information, communications media
and national and international allies, as well as more limited ﬁnancial resources.
Moreover, critical observers who could countervail power asymmetries and help
to create greater procedural transparency (like the ombudsman, personnel from
the ILO, and NGO representatives) will not be present during most of these
processes. In such spaces, it is necessary to focus on developing the precondi-
tions for participatory governance, including awareness building on rights
and citizenship as well as institutional support for the strengthening of indigen-
ous organisations.
We have also shown that the new consultation legislation itself contains
many provisions that endorse asymmetrical consultation constellations
 Interview de Echave.
 See Javier Arellano Yanguas, ‘Minería sin fronteras? Conﬂicto y desarrollo en regiones
mineras del Perú’, Investigaciones Geográﬁcas,  (), pp. –.
 O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization and Conceptual Problems’.
 Gaventa, ‘Towards Participatory Governance’, p. .
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rather than mitigating them, among them, the stipulation that the responsible
state institutions will decide who and how to consult. This is problematic, as
those who shape a particular space aﬀect who has power within it; we therefore
expect that the new spaces will be ﬁlled with ‘old power’. For example, the
provision that the representatives of the aﬀected populations, and not their
representative institutions, be consulted, and that only those organisations
within the aﬀected area will be taken into account will leave weak local popu-
lations unprotected, as they will not negotiate in tandem with the regional or
national organisations they are aﬃliated with. It is likely that stronger and
more uniﬁed organisations will be able to better use future consultations to
achieve their objectives, while those that are weaker will be worse oﬀ. This
is particularly relevant given that the logic behind prior consultation and
FPIC is to include marginalised and under-represented groups in decision-
making.
To do justice to the new consultation legislation, some of the articles
included are indeed likely to improve participatory processes. They contain
some important measures to counterbalance power asymmetries, such as the
inclusion of facilitators and translators, logistical support for internal delibera-
tions, the stipulation that oﬃcial reports about the consultations and their out-
comes be openly accessible, and, the explicit ambition to support the
participation of vulnerable groups from within local populations (for
example, women, elderly persons, children, and persons with disabilities).
These provisions will not, however, be suﬃcient to create the conditions ne-
cessary for dialogue to take place on an equal footing.
Several case studies have shown that additional mechanisms can help reduce
power asymmetries within consultations. These include the participation of re-
gional or national indigenous organisations in support of the local ones, the
presence of specialised advisors selected by the aﬀected groups, suﬃcient
resources and time for making internal deliberation processes possible, the
timely circulation of complete and fully comprehensible information, cooper-
ation with researchers and non-governmental organisations, and access to
media. Moreover, strengthening the intercultural character of the dialogue
and the respect for diﬀerent moral visions and concepts (for example, regard-
ing territory, resource use or decision-making) in local contexts is crucial.
With this in mind, we believe that it is important to systematically foster,
 Ibid., p.  and Cornwall cit. after ibid., p. .
 Rodríguez Garavito and Orduz Salinas, La consulta previa: dilemas y soluciones (Bogotá:
DeJusticia, ); Iván Bascopé Sanjínes (ed.), Lecciones aprendidas sobre consulta previa
(La Paz: CEJIS, ).
 See Almut Schilling-Vacaﬂor, ‘Contestations over Indigenous Participation in Bolivia’s
Extractive Industry: Ideology, Practices, and Legal Norms’, GIGA Working Papers, 
().
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by legal and socio-political means, a wide variety of such practices so as to make
consultations more equitable and transparent.
The lack of joint and binding decisions
We have found that the actual inﬂuence exerted by the groups consulted on
the content of the law and the decree was very limited. Many of their
claims and proposals were excluded from the texts ultimately adopted, and
this is what contributed to the rejection of the legislation that was ﬁnally
approved. A serious attempt on the part of the state to make genuine compro-
mises and develop mutually acceptable solutions to the disagreements that
came to light was missing. This way of proceeding is inherently risky, as our
study has shown that unresolved conﬂicts have only been postponed and cer-
tainly not transformed. Furthermore, the government gravely violated the con-
sultation law’s stipulation that agreements reached during a consultation are
binding. Not all agreements from Mesa  were incorporated into the consult-
ation law, and at the end of the meta-consultation on the decree some of the
agreements reached were even changed so as to have a contrary meaning.
A stark illustration of the fatal consequences arising from the government’s
lack of willingness to seek dialogue and to ﬁnd compromises is the Baguazo, a
conﬂict that only escalated in such a brutal fashion after the long period during
which García’s government failed to address the issues behind the protests, and
even mocked and repressed the dissidents. Hence, it is doubtful that the
Humala government’s reluctance to revise the concessions and extractive pro-
jects already in place with regard to their socio-environmental impacts and to
remedy the lack of prior consultation will promote peace in the long term.
In fact, the ﬁnal decision, and, thus, the outcome of a consultation process,
is the most contested issue. This became clear during the discussions within the
United Nations General Assembly on the UNDRIP. There, several states
strongly opposed indigenous rights to self-determination and to FPIC. The
issue at stake here is whether the aﬀected groups must only be consulted,
without them actually having any real decision-making power, or whether
the consultations should be consequential, meaning that they play a decisive
role in shaping state policies and legislation. Vetoing states generally emphasise
their sovereign role in governance, which they do not want to see threatened
by any external or internal actors. As a consequence, indigenous aspirations to
self-determined development are frequently trumped by so-called ‘national
interests’. In contrast, indigenous groups and local communities tend to
argue that their rights are non-negotiable and that a just process in which
diverse interests within the state are balanced should be the basis for
deﬁning what constitutes a ‘national interest’. They state that this important
decision should not simply be transferred to the government.
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We believe that three prerequisites in particular are necessary in order to
improve consultation practices regarding the ﬁnal decision: compliance with
the principle that established agreements are binding; recognition that it is
not enough to simply highlight existing disagreements, but that there should
be a real eﬀort made to ﬁnd viable solutions to the most conﬂictive issues;
and recognition that human rights are not negotiable and, because of this,
the expansion of extractive industries should be restricted so as to protect
these rights. The new consultation legislation does not foresee speciﬁc mechan-
isms for monitoring the implementation of agreements and sanctioning rights
violations. We feel that compliance with the above-mentioned standards
would not only be fruitful for the state’s enhanced legitimacy and governabil-
ity, but could also help prevent future violent conﬂicts. However, putting these
prerequisites into practice would imply the overhaul of historically developed
power asymmetries and entrenched structures, which is not likely to happen in
the near future.
Furthermore, in various socio-environmental conﬂicts that have occurred
around the globe the demand for the implementation of prior consultations
has, in general, not been expressed only for its own sake. Rather, it has been
conceived of as a channel for resolving signiﬁcant underlying problems, for
example, with regard to environmental pollution or beneﬁt-sharing. Thus,
in contexts that are characterised by great social inequality and in which
human rights and environmental standards are often disrespected, the imple-
mentation of consultations alone will not transform conﬂicts. Rather, these
deeply entrenched problems must also be simultaneously addressed. Indeed,
in the long term the demand for comprehensive prior consultation could be
helpful in bringing these underlying issues to the surface and ﬁnding non-
violent, joint solutions to them.
Conclusions
The main parts of this article were written in  and , when Peru’s con-
sultation legislation had only recently been adopted. However, by December
 eight prior consultation processes had been concluded. These new devel-
opments allow us to brieﬂy reﬂect on the limitations and potential of prior
 Such follow-up mechanisms would be of crucial importance, especially within the Peruvian
context where indigenous rights have often been disregarded. See, for example, the discussion
of the Río Corrientes case in Bebbington, Scurrah and Bielich, Los movimientos sociales,
p. . Even in countries like Canada, which are known for higher rights protection standards
at the domestic level, the lack of eﬀective follow-up hinders more socio-environmentally re-
sponsible corporate practices (Ciaran O‘Faircheallaigh, ‘Environmental Agreements, EIA
Follow-up and Aboriginal Participation in Environmental Management: The Canadian
Experience’, Environmental Impact Assessment Review,  (), pp. –).
 Almut Schilling‐Vacaﬂor and Riccarda Flemmer
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 29 Oct 2015 IP address: 213.39.242.2
consultation in transforming conﬂict in practice. Five of these processes were
about hydrocarbon projects, and two were about conservation areas, while the
eighth concerned intercultural health-care policies. No consultation process
has yet occurred in the mining sector; this is particularly due to the state’s
remaining resistance to consult peasant communities. Hence, our article sug-
gests that contestations about the subjects that have rights to prior consult-
ation and to FPIC merit further scrutiny. In this context, the rights of the
general citizenry to participate in decisions regarding extraction projects that
aﬀect them should also be discussed more comprehensively.
The ﬁrst consultations carried out in the hydrocarbon sector did not dem-
onstrate high levels of visible conﬂict. This was partly due to the state’s choice
to begin implementing consultation processes about new oil and gas conces-
sions in areas that had little experience with extraction activities. This decision
was made after indigenous local groups blockaded the ﬁrst consultation about
oil block  shortly after the consultation legislation entered into force. This
blockade was due to unclear property rights and the grave environmental and
health damages caused by previous oil projects in the area. The state’s reluc-
tance to initiate new consultations in the mining sector and in zones with
greater resistance towards new projects indicates that it has postponed its con-
frontation with more conﬂictive local contexts.
Taking a closer look at the consultations that were concluded in the hydro-
carbon sector reveals that eﬀective participation therein was limited due to the
absence of preconditions for participatory governance within the consulted
groups – for instance, weak structures on the part of the local organisations
and a lack of capacity to understand and evaluate the information presented
by the consulting entity, as well as the imposition of consultation procedures
by the state entity responsible for carrying out the consultations. While the
Peruvian government has presented these consultations as success stories,
several civil society organisations have labelled them as ‘empty’. Furthermore,
the resulting agreements have been quite vague and there are no formal follow-
up mechanisms in place to supervise compliance with them.
The concluded consultations also exhibited some positive surprises. For
example, the consulting state entity developed the diverse consultation plans
together with the local indigenous groups, which is not obligatory according
to the legal framework. This entity also responded positively to indigenous
organisations’ demands for more inclusive and participatory procedures and
for measures to counterbalance power asymmetries. For example, in the hydro-
carbon sector the consulting entity Perupetro extended the information events
 The prior consultation processes regarding hydrocarbon projects were conducted for new oil
blocks in the Amazonian regions Ucayali and Loreto.
 Interviews with representatives of indigenous organisations and NGOs in Lima, April and
December .
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from one to two days, made the meetings more interactive by including group
work, and also ﬁnancially supported the presence of indigenous advisors and
local interpreters.
However, we should be cautious about being too enthusiastic about such se-
lective bright spots, especially when given the current national and regional
context. Generally, in Latin America the trend is that citizens’ rights to partici-
pate in extraction projects that aﬀect them are extremely weak; therefore, these
groups do not have a decisive voice in the respective decisions. In Peru, extrac-
tion projects have been presented as ‘national interests’, and the Humala gov-
ernment continues to uphold Peru’s ‘market fundamentalism’, which consists
of the ‘demonisation of environmentalism’ and the hope that private invest-
ment will compensate for state failure. Hence, we cannot expect the
Peruvian state to change its previous attitude and become responsive to indigen-
ous views and grievances in the short term. In June  Peruvian civil society
and the indigenous Unity Pact protested in the streets against a legal initiative of
the government to reduce environmental standards and citizen participation
rights. The law was adopted by Congress in July  and is criticised for
further marginalising the role of the Environment Ministry in EIA approvals
and other decisions concerning natural reserves. It has also reduced the
maximum amounts of environmental ﬁnes. Protesters warned about
‘Humala creating his own Baguazo’ and showed that ﬁve years after the
events of June  they remain unresolved and the underlying tensions and
conﬂicts still play an important role in national debates.
While we do not adopt a fatalistic view, we emphasise the importance of
states’ and indigenous peoples’ process of learning about and moving towards
intercultural communication and dialogue. It is worth keeping in mind that par-
ticipatory events cannot be totally controlled from above; rather, they can
develop their own dynamics that might, in the long term, contribute to changing
the rules of the game. To give consultation processes the potential to transform
conﬂicts, building the capacity of local populations is essential, as is paying
 José Carlos Orihuela, ‘The Environmental Rules of Economic Development: Governing Air
Pollution from Smelters in Chuquicamata and La Oroya’, Journal of Latin American Studies,
:  (), pp. –.
 The law  ‘Law that establishes Tributary Measures, Simpliﬁcations of Proceedings and
Permits for the Promotion and Dynamisation of Investments in the Country’ was presented
by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and adopted in Congress on  July .
 See Claudia Cisneros ‘Autogolpe al Perú: se viene el Baguazo de Humala’ ( July ),
available at www.larepublica.pe/columnistas/de-centro-radical/autogolpe-al-peru-se-viene-
el-baguazo-de-humala---. As of June , trials against indigenous leaders are
still open and investigations at the national and international level are ongoing. The
results of the investigations into the Baguazo are contested, especially regarding the role of
mining companies and the US government in pushing the Peruvian government towards
police intervention, see Jacqueline Fowks, ‘Perú sigue sin esclarecer qué pasó en el enfrenta-
miento de Bagua en ’ ( October ) available at www.internacional.elpais.com/inter
nacional////actualidad/_.html.
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special attention to local power asymmetries and divergent intercultural under-
standings of development, territory, decision-making, and society-nature rela-
tions. Finally, while acknowledging that legislation can be important in
enhancing or inhibiting participatory processes in practice, we should not
forget that the implementation of rights can go well beyond legislation and is
often better promoted through public discussion, the monitoring of rights viola-
tions, agitation, and advocacy.Thus, whether and to what extent prior consult-
ation can open the door to the formulation of joint development visions and
practices, implying power-sharing and open outcomes, will depend, in part,
on the processes and impacts of future contestations.
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